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Using a large international firm-level data set, we estimate separate effects of host and parent 
country taxation on the location decisions of multinational firms. Both types of taxation are 
estimated to have a negative impact on the location of new foreign subsidiaries. In fact, the 
impact of parent country taxation is estimated to be relatively large, possibly reflecting its 
international discriminatory nature. For the cross-section of multinational firms, we find that 
parent firms tend to be located in countries with a relatively low taxation of foreign-source 
income. Overall, our results show that parent-country taxation – despite the general possibility 
of deferral of taxation until income repatriation – is instrumental in shaping the structure of 
multinational enterprise. 
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1.      Introduction 
With globalization and the progressive removal of barriers to trade, an increasing 
number of companies develop international activities. To access foreign markets, firms face a 
choice between producing goods at home for exports and producing abroad. A host of tax and 
non-tax factors affect the decision whether to relocate production abroad. Among the non-tax 
factors are the size of a foreign market, its growth prospects, wage and productivity levels 
abroad, the foreign regulatory and legal environment, and distance from the home country 
(see Görg and Greenway (2004), Barrios et al. (2005) and Mayer and Ottaviano (2007) for 
recent reviews). The impact of taxation on foreign direct investment (FDI) has been the 
subject of a sizeable literature, as reviewed by de Mooij and Everdeen (2006) and Devereux 
and Maffini (2007). 
Studies of the effect of taxation on FDI location decisions generally examine host 
country taxation to the exclusion of parent country taxation. The contribution of this paper is 
to jointly consider the impact of host and parent country taxation on multinational firm 
location decisions. As a first level of taxation, the host country may impose corporate income 
taxation on the income of local foreign subsidiaries. In addition, the host country could levy a 
non-resident dividend withholding tax on the subsidiary’s earnings at the time they are 
repatriated to the parent firm. But taxation need not stop at the host country level. The parent 
country can further choose to levy a corporate income tax on the resident multinational’s 
foreign-source income. We examine the independent impact of all three levels of taxation on 
the location decisions of European multinationals over the period 1999-2003.  
A multinational consists of a parent firm in one country and foreign subsidiaries in 
one or more foreign countries. In this paper we consider the impact of international taxation 
on the firm’s location choices regarding the parent firm as well as any foreign subsidiary. 
First, we reconsider the traditional problem of choosing the location of FDI. Specifically, we   3
examine how multinationals headquartered in a certain country choose the location of new 
foreign subsidiaries. Second, we contribute to the literature on the organizational structure of 
the multinational firm by examining the location choice of the parent firm. A multinational 
firm with a parent firm in a particular country can develop in a variety of ways, including the 
establishment of new foreign subsidiaries, cross-border M&As, and the inversion of pre-
existing multinational firms whereby a previous foreign subsidiary becomes the new parent 
firm. Rather than consider these mechanisms separately, our approach in this paper is to 
examine the existing distribution of multinationals at a particular point in time to see whether 
there is a tendency for the parent firm to be located in the county that levies a relatively low 
international taxation of foreign-source income.  
For this study, we have collected detailed information on how parent-country tax 
systems interact bilaterally with corporate taxation and non-resident withholding taxation in 
the host country. Specifically, we collect information on whether or not countries tax the 
income of their multinationals on a worldwide basis, and whether foreign tax credits are 
provided for non-resident withholding taxes only or also for the underlying host country 
corporate tax (as, for instance, in the United States). As an alternative to worldwide taxes, 
parent countries may partially or fully exempt foreign source income from taxation. As an 
example, Germany exempts 95 percent of the foreign source income of German 
multinationals from taxation.  
Data on the international structures of European multinationals are obtained from the 
Amadeus database. This data set allows us to consider multinational companies resident in a 
broad set of countries, each potentially having foreign subsidiaries in many other countries. 
Thus, unlike earlier work, this paper considers multinational firm location choices in a setting 
of N by N countries. In addition to being an innovative approach, this multi-country 
framework is in fact necessary to obtain sufficient variation in parent-country corporate   4
taxation (not highly correlated with host-country corporate taxation) to be able to separately 
estimate its impact on international location decisions.  
Host-country and parent-country corporate income taxation both appear to discourage 
the location of foreign subsidiaries in a particular country. In fact, the estimated negative 
impact of the two types of taxation – as derived from statutory tax information – is about of 
equal size. At first glance, this result is surprising as the option to defer parent-country 
corporate taxation would suggest that this type of taxation is relatively unimportant. After all, 
this has often been the argument for not including parent-country corporate tax rates in 
studies of location choices in the first place. The sizeable impact of parent-country taxation 
on location choices could reflect that this type of taxation tends to be discriminatory against 
foreign ownership by a particular country. International parent-country taxation obviously 
does not apply to local owners of productive assets, and it may also not apply or apply less to 
potential foreign owners from third countries. Parent country taxation thus tends to put 
foreign owners from a particular country at a competitive disadvantage, which can explain a 
greater incentive to avoid this type of taxation.  
A multinational that chooses its parent-firm location from among the countries where 
it operates will have to pay the same corporate income taxes applied to locally generated 
income regardless of the location of its headquarters. The only differences in fact lie in 
potentially different non-resident dividend withholding taxes and parent-country corporate 
income taxes. Thus, naturally we only expect variation in these international taxation across 
potential parent countries to affect headquarter location. Our results suggest that the corporate 
taxation of foreign-source income is important in shaping the organizational structure of 
multinational firms.   
Some firms are interested in becoming international by establishing only a single 
foreign subsidiary somewhere, while others have a need to maintain subsidiaries in almost   5
every corner of the world. At the same time, some multinationals may consider the entire 
world as a potential choice of location, while others - for whatever reason - can only 
effectively operate in a limited number of countries. These subsidiary and country 
‘dimensions’ of a multinational’s location choices can be expected to affect the sensitivity of 
location to international taxation. To see this, note that the probability of subsidiary location 
in any one of many countries is rather small, if a multinational wishes to establish a foreign 
subsidiary in only one country. Correspondingly, we expect that the impact of taxation on the 
probability of location in a country to be rather small as well. For a multinational that wishes 
to operate in 2 or more countries (out of many), the sensitivity of the probability of location 
to taxation may be higher. Along similar lines, the sensitivity of the likelihood of location to 
taxation may be relatively high, if a multinational has to pick a single country of location out 
of 2 countries rather than out of many.  
The multi-country nature of our data set allows us to investigate how these 
dimensions of a multinational’s choice problem affect estimated tax sensitivities. We indeed 
find that the tax sensitivity of location increase with the number or countries of location (for 
low numbers of location countries), and in fact peaks for intermediate numbers of countries 
of location. As a methodological exercise, we further estimate the tax sensitivity of location 
choice regarding foreign subsidiaries for multinationals headquartered in one of three 
countries (France, Germany, or the United Kingdom) that establish foreign subsidiaries in 
one or more of these countries. When we somewhat arbitrarily shrink the choice set in this 
way, we indeed estimate a rather sizeable tax coefficient. These results together suggest that 
estimates of tax sensitivities of location decisions are best based on large international data 
sets as in the current paper, and that firm heterogeneity regarding the scale of needed foreign 
establishments matters.     6
Devereux and Griffith (1998) investigate how host-country taxation affects the 
subsidiary location decisions of US multinationals in several large European countries 
(France, Germany, and United Kingdom) over the period 1980-1994. They find that – 
conditional on the choice to locate production abroad – host-country average effective tax 
rates (but not marginal effective tax rates) are important in determining foreign location 
choice, even if taxation does not appear to affect the earlier choice to locate abroad or to 
export. For German multinationals, Buettner and Ruf (2007) in turn find that location 
decisions in 18 potential host countries between 1996 and 2003 are affected more by host-
country statutory tax rates than effective average tax rates, while they find no effect of 
marginal effective tax rates.  
Several authors have previously found a role for parent-country taxation to affect the 
location of FDI. For US multinationals, Kemsley (1998) finds that the host country tax only 
affects the ratio of US exports to foreign production over the period 1984-1992 if the 
multinationals find themselves in excess credit positions.
1 Analogously, a role of parent-
country taxation in affecting FDI into the United States is found by Hines (1996), who shows 
that foreign countries with worldwide taxation invest relatively much in US states with high 
state taxes. This reflects that multinationals located in countries with worldwide taxation may 
be able to obtain foreign tax credits for US state corporate income taxes.  
In the remainder, section 2 describes the tax treatment of the foreign-source income of 
multinational firms. Section 3 discusses our firm-level data. Section 4 presents estimates of 
the impact of international taxation on the location of foreign subsidiaries. Section 5 in turn 
                                                 
1 US multinationals are subject to worldwide taxation in the United States. Thus, they have to pay tax in the 
United States on their foreign-source income, subject to the provision of a foreign tax credit for taxes already 
paid in the host country. The foreign tax credit, in practice, is limited to the amount of US tax due on the 
foreign-source income. This implies that the overall tax on the foreign income is the host country tax if this tax 
exceeds the US tax, while it is the US tax if this tax is the higher of the two. US taxes on foreign source income 
can be deferred until the income is repatriated.   7
provides evidence on the impact of international taxation on parent firm location. Finally, 
section 6 concludes. 
 
2.     The international tax system 
This section describes the corporate tax system applicable to a multinational company 
with foreign subsidiaries.
2 Consider a multinational company with a parent located in home 
country p and a subsidiary located in host country s. Both home and host countries may tax 
the subsidiary’s income. First, the host country may levy a corporate income tax at rate ts on 
this income. The second column of Table 1 shows the statutory corporate income tax rates for 
the 33 European countries in our sample for the year 2003.
3 These statutory tax rates are 
those on distributed profits and include local taxes and applicable surcharges. In our sample, 
the corporate tax rates for 2003 range from a low of 12.5% in Ireland to a high of 39.59% in 
Germany.  
Next, the host country levies a non-resident dividend withholding tax at rate ws on the 
subsidiary’s net-of-corporate-tax income upon repatriation of this income to the parent. Table 
2 provides information on the applicable withholding tax rates on dividends paid by fully-
owned subsidiaries to their non-resident parents in 2003. For example, a dividend paid by a 
Belgian subsidiary to its parent company located in Estonia will bear a withholding tax of 
25%, while the withholding tax on a dividend paid by an Estonian subsidiary to its Belgian 
parent company has a zero rate. The withholding tax rates for transactions involving two EU 
Member States are zero on account of the EU Parent-Subsidiary Directive
4.  
                                                 
2 See also Huizinga, Laeven and Nicodème (2008) for a description of corporate tax systems as they apply to 
multinational companies. 
3  For illustrative purposes, the tables report taxation data for the year 2003 only, although we have collected 
these data for the entire period 1999-2003. 
4  Note that in 2003, prior to their adhesion, many new EU Member States still maintained non-zero rates vis-à-
vis EU countries and vice versa.   8
The net-of-withholding-tax dividend by the parent company is in principle taxed in 
the parent country – subject to some form of double tax relief as recommended by the OECD 
Model Tax Treaty or as prescribed in the EU Parent-Subsidiary Directive. Some countries 
operate an exemption system. In this instance, the dividend is not taxed in the parent country, 
if the provided exemption is full. The overall international rate of taxation on the subsidiary’s 
income is then given by 1 – (1 – ts)(1 – ws) or ts + ws – ts ws . 
Alternatively, the home country may tax the worldwide income of its multinationals 
and subject the received dividend to corporate income taxation at a rate tp. Generally, a 
foreign tax credit is provided for taxes paid in the host country, usually limited to the amount 
of the home tax due on the foreign-source income. Some countries apply an indirect tax 
credit system under which both the corporate tax and the withholding tax paid in the host 
country are credited against the home corporate income tax. In case the home country’s 
corporate income tax tp is higher than the overall host country tax rate ts + ws – ts ws, the firm 
pay income tax in the home country at a rate tp – [ts + ws – ts ws] so that combined, effective 
tax rate is equal to tp. If instead the home country's corporate income tax rate is lower than the 
overall host country's rates, the firm is said to be in excess foreign tax credit and it will pay 
no further tax in the home country (having reduced its home tax liability to zero by using 
foreign tax credits). In this instance, the combined, effective tax rate is ts + ws – ts w s. In 
summary, for home countries with an indirect tax credit system, the combined, effective tax 
rate is equal to max [tp ; ts + ws – ts ws].   
Home countries may restrict the foreign tax credit to cover only host country non-
resident withholding taxes giving rise as under a direct tax credit system. In this case, the 
multinational has to pay tax in the parent country to the extent that tp exceeds ws and now that 
combined, effective tax rate is given by ts + (1 – ts) max[tp, ws].    9
Alternatively, some home countries offer neither exemption nor a foreign tax credit 
for taxes paid abroad, but instead allow foreign taxes to be deducted from home-country 
taxable corporate income. This amounts to the deduction system with a combined, effective 
tax rate of 1 – (1 – ts)(1 – ws)(1 – tp).  
Finally, in some rather exceptional cases, no double tax relief is provided at all. With 
full double taxation, the combined, effective tax rate becomes ts + ws – ts ws + tp. 
Columns 3 and 4 of table 1 indicate which double tax relief system is applied by 
European countries. As seen in the table, some countries provide different double tax relief to 
treaty partners and non-treaty countries. Thus, we need to know whether there exist double 
tax treaties among the countries in our sample. On a bilateral basis, this information is 
provided in table 3 with the value 1 indicating the existence of such a treaty and 0 otherwise.  
The table indicates that for many countries the treaty network is not complete. For example, 
in 2003 Czech Republic has a treaty with all countries in the sample except Malta and 
Turkey. From Table 1, we see that this implies that dividends from all foreign subsidiaries 
paid to a Czech parent benefit from an indirect tax credit, except for those paid by a Maltese 
or a Turkish subsidiary where the deduction system applies. Information from Tables 1 to 3 
allows us to calculate the combined, effective tax rate on foreign dividend for any pair of 
home and host countries. To fix ideas, consider the case of a dividend paid by a Maltese 
subsidiary to its Czech parent in 2003. Table 1 shows that the statutory corporate tax rate in 
Malta is 35%. We infer from Table 2 that net profits paid as a dividend to a foreign company 
are never subject to a non-resident dividend withholding tax in Malta. As already mentioned, 
Table 3 indicates that no tax treaty was in force between the two countries in 2003 so that 
from Table 1 we see that incoming foreign dividends benefit from a deduction system in 
Czech Republic. Finally, the same table indicates that the applicable corporate tax rate in this 
country is 31%. From the formula above, the combined, effective tax rate equals 1 – (1 –   10
0.35) × (1 – 0) × (1 – 0.31) = 55.15%. This rate is considerably higher than the Maltese 
corporate tax rate of 35%. This suggests that the additional taxation of multinational firms, in 
the form of withholding taxes and home country corporate income taxation, potentially has an 
independent and significant impact on international location decisions. 
Below, we will investigate the independent influences of host-country corporate 
income and dividend withholding taxation and home-country corporate income taxation on 
corporate location decisions. To make parameter estimates comparable across tax measures, 
it is useful to construct all three tax measures as shares of the foreign subsidiary’s pre-tax 
income. The host country tax rate, of course, is already defined as a share of the subsidiary’s 
pre-tax income. Our withholding tax measure will be (1 – ts) ws to reflect that the withholding 
tax applies to the subsidiary’s income net of the host country corporate tax. Finally, the 
residual parent country corporate income tax – as a share of the subsidiary’s pre-tax income – 
is computed as the difference between the combined, effective tax rate and ts + ws – ts ws  We 
will define the international tax to be the sum of the withholding tax and residual parent-
country corporate tax both expressed as shares of the subsidiary’s pre-tax income. 
Equivalently, the international tax is the difference between the combined, effective tax and 
the host country corporate income tax. 
Unlike host-country corporate income taxes, withholding taxes and home-country 
corporate income taxes are generally deferred until the foreign source income is repatriated to 
the parent in the form of dividends. Deferral, of course, reduces the present value of taxation. 
Thus, withholding taxes and home-country corporate income taxes – all calculated as shares 
of the subsidiary’s pre-tax income – are expected to ‘bite’ less than host country corporate 
income taxes. Whether the deferral of withholding taxes and home-country corporate income 
taxes serves to make these taxes immaterial for location decisions is an empirical matter. This 
is what we turn to in the empirical section below.   11
 
3.         Multinational enterprise data 
The data on the structure of multinational firms in Europe are taken from the 
Amadeus database.
5 This database provides standard accounting data as well as data on 
ownership relationships within corporate groups. The ownership data enable us to match 
European firms with their domestic subsidiaries and foreign subsidiaries located in other 
European countries.
6 A firm is taken to be a subsidiary, if at least 50% of the shares are 
owned by a single other firm. A multinational company has one or more foreign subsidiaries. 
We have data on multinational firms operating in 33 European countries over the years 1999-
2003. 
Information on the number of parent companies and subsidiaries in our data set is 
provided in Panel A of Table 4. The total number of parent companies is 906, while the 
number of foreign subsidiaries is 3,094. The United Kingdom with 144 parent companies has 
most parent companies, followed by France with 116 parent companies. Each subsidiary has 
a home country (where its parent is located) and a host country (where it is located itself). For 
each country, the table lists the number of subsidiaries by home country and by host country. 
The table indicates that, for example, France, Spain and the United Kingdom are the home 
country to relatively many subsidiaries. Hence, there are relatively many subsidiaries with a 
parent firm in one of these countries. Denmark, Spain and the United Kingdom, instead, are 
the host country to relatively many subsidiaries. 
                                                 
  
5 The database is created by collecting standardized data received from 50 vendors across Europe. The local 
source for this data is generally the office of the Registrar of Companies. 
  
6 The Amadeus database only contains information on European firms and we therefore only cover the 
European operations of the multinationals in our sample. Therefore, we cannot consider how tax differences 
between European countries and other parts of the world affect the capital structure of subsidiaries in Europe. 
While this is an important caveat to be mentioned, we do not see this as a major limitation of our analysis 
because European multinationals typically derive much of their revenues from operations in Europe rather than 
other parts of the world.   12
Our subsequent empirical work on foreign subsidiary location aims to predict the 
location of a new foreign subsidiary in one of 32 foreign European countries. The dependent 
variable, called Subsidiary location, takes on a value of one if a particular country is selected 
as a subsidiary’s location and it is zero otherwise.  
Summary statistics on the subsidiary location variable, the tax variables and some 
controls are provided in Panel B of Table 4 (see the Appendix for variable definitions and 
data sources). The 26,567 observations reported in the table reflect the basic regression 1 of 
Table 5.
7 The mean value of the overall effective tax is 0.353. This mean effective tax, in 
effect, is the sum of a mean host country tax of 0.302 and a mean international tax of 0.051. 
Among the control variables, GDP bilateral is the ratio of the GDP of a potential host 
country and the sum of the GDPs of all other potential foreign (but not domestic) locations. 
This variable captures market size, and it is expected to exert a positive impact on the 
probability of subsidiary location in a host country.  
Next, Contiguity is a dummy variable signaling a common border between host and 
home countries. A common border is expected to make location in the host country more 
likely.  
Origin of Law is a dummy variable indicating whether host and home countries both 
have legal systems with a common origin. Similar legal systems may promote subsidiary 
location if it facilitates international legal work. On the other hand, legal system similarity 
may discourage location, if multinationals subject to a superior legal system can benefit from 
‘exporting’ this system to countries with inferior systems.   
Difference in labor costs is the log of the absolute value of the difference in labor 
costs between host and home countries in a common currency. High host-country labor costs 
are expected to discourage subsidiary location.    13
Economic freedom is an index of the extent of soundness of the legal system, absence 
of trade barriers and absence of price controls. Economic freedom should make a country 
attractive as a subsidiary location.  
Finally, EU membership subsidiary is a dummy variable flagging EU membership of 
a prospective host country. EU membership, to the extent that is signals commitment to EU 
standards of dealing with foreign investors, could engender subsidiary location.  
Panel C of Table 4 provides correlation coefficients among the location, tax and 
control variables. Interestingly, location is positively and significantly related to the host 
country tax, but negatively and significantly to the international tax. The first correlation 
reflects that subsidiaries tend to be located in larger countries, which tend to have relatively 
high corporate income taxes. In the table, the host country tax is indeed positively and 
significantly correlated with the GDP bilateral variable as an index of host country relative 
size. The negative correlation between location and the international tax could reflect that 
subsidiary location is chosen so as to mitigate international double taxation. Also note that 
the host country tax and the international tax are negatively correlated, perhaps reflecting the 
operation of the foreign tax credit mechanism. 
       
4.  Empirical results on taxation and subsidiary location 
4.1   Basic results 
One important way to change the structure of multinational firms is to establish a new 
foreign subsidiary (either by starting the foreign establishment from scratch or by acquiring 
it). Initially, we examine the location of new foreign subsidiaries, i.e. the location of foreign 
subsidiaries only during the first year that they report accounting data. Specifically, we 
consider foreign subsidiaries that appear first in one of the years 1999 to 2003. By only 
                                                                                                                                                        
7 Note that the mean value of the location variable is not exactly 1/32 due to the absence of data for some   14
considering location choice in the year of establishment, we ensure that observations for 
different foreign subsidiaries are independent. By focusing on only foreign subsidiaries, we 
condition on a foreign location and hence examine the impact of international taxation on the 
location choice among competing foreign locations. Our data set encompasses 33 European 
countries, which implies that for a multinational resident in a particular country there are 32 
foreign location options. Accordingly, for each new foreign subsidiary, we construct 32 
binary variables that take on a value of one if location is in a certain foreign country and zero 
otherwise.  Regarding each potential location for each new foreign subsidiary, there thus is a 
binary choice. Location choice is assumed to be determined by the international tax system 
and a range of other location or country characteristics. The underlying binary choice model 
is estimated using the conditional logit approach of McFadden (1974, 1976).
8  
Regression 1 in Table 5 includes the effective tax rate, i.e. the sum of the host-country 
corporate income tax rate and the international tax rate, yielding a coefficient of -3.964 that is 
significant at the 1 percent level. Alternatively, a one percentage point increase in the 
effective tax rate is estimated to reduce the probability of location in a country by 0.615 
percent, while the semi-elasticity of the probability of location with respect to the effective 
tax rate is estimated to be -0.761. Among the controls, a country’s relative GDP is estimated 
to increase the probability of subsidiary location. Contiguous countries similarly are more 
likely to receive foreign subsidiaries. Similarity of legal systems, as proxied by the Origin of 
Law variable, instead appears to discourage location. This could reflect that multinationals 
subject to, say, a common law system aim to ‘export’ some of the benefits of such a legal 
system to countries with other legal systems. Relatively high labor costs in a prospective host 
country in addition appear to make prospective host countries less attractive. Economic 
                                                                                                                                                        
location options. 
8 The conditional logit model imposes the axiom of independence of irrelevant alternatives, which implies that 
adding a third option or changing the characteristics of a third alternative does not affect the relative odds 
between any two options considered.   15
liberalization, as proxied by the Economic Freedom variable, instead makes potential host 
countries more attractive. EU membership, finally, is seen to have a positive impact on the 
probability of foreign subsidiary location. 
Regression 2 substitutes the host country corporate tax rate for the effective tax rate. 
The estimated parameter on the host country tax variable has a somewhat smaller magnitude 
of -2.929 and it is again significant at the 1 percent level. In line with this, a one percentage 
point increase in the host country tax rate is estimated to reduce the probability of location 
by 0.274 percent, while the estimated semi-elasticity of the probability of location with 
respect to the host country tax rate is -0.306. The controls enter regression 2 in qualitatively 
the same way as before. 
Regression 3 in turn includes the international tax variable – reflecting both non-
resident withholding taxation in the host country and parent country corporate taxation – 
with an estimated coefficient of -2.205. The corresponding marginal effect and semi-
elasticity of the probability of location with respect to the international tax rate are estimated 
to be relatively large at -0.074 and -0.076, but these estimates are statistically insignificant. 
Next, regression 4 includes the host country tax rate and the international tax rate 
jointly, yielding estimated coefficients of -3.928 and -4.128, respectively. Similarly, we find 
that the probability of location is somewhat more sensitive to the international tax rate than 
to the host country tax rate variables.  
Finally, regression 5 includes a separate host country corporate tax rate, non-resident 
withholding tax rate, and parent country corporate tax rate. Parameter estimates for the host 
country tax rate and parent country corporate tax rate are found to be negative and 
statistically significant, while the non-resident dividend withholding tax rate enters with a 
statistically insignificant coefficient. A one percentage point increase in the host country and 
parent country tax rates is significantly estimated to reduce the probability of location by   16
0.761 and 1.002 percent, respectively, while the analogous effect of the non-resident 
withholding tax rate is estimated to be insignificant at 0.179.  
The relatively large effect of the parent-country corporate tax rate is surprising, as this 
tax can generally be deferred until dividend repatriation and it is further diminished by the 
potential in some countries for so-called worldwide income averaging. This latter practice 
allows multinationals resident in, for instance, the U.S. to claim foreign tax credits for 
foreign taxes paid in high-tax countries against U.S. taxes due on income from low-tax 
countries. To explain why the parent tax rate may be relatively important, note that this tax is 
borne by potential parent firms from a particular country, and not by parent firms from other 
countries or by local firms. The parent country tax thus puts the affected parent firms at a 
comparative disadvantage at owning assets in a host country vis-à-vis other potential owners. 
Withholding taxes, of course, also put foreign owners at a comparative disadvantage at 
owning local assets vis-à-vis local owners. However, non-resident dividend withholding 
taxes tend to vary relatively little across residents of different foreign parent countries. At the 
same time, withholding taxes in many instances are zero and otherwise are quite low. This 
could explain the apparent insensitivity of subsidiary location decisions to the withholding 
tax. 
 
4.2.  Robustness tests 
In an extension, we consider that a new subsidiary can be located either abroad or at 
home. To do this, we include episodes where a domestic subsidiary is established in the 
sample so that the number of potential national locations increases from 32 countries to 33 
countries. Analogously to regression 1 of Table 5, we estimate an effective tax rate effect 
noting that the domestic option increases the sample size from 26,567 to 51,061. The 
estimated coefficient for the effective tax is -1.465, which is less than the corresponding   17
estimate of -3.964 in regression 1 of Table 5. A one percentage point increase in the effective 
tax is now estimated to reduce the probability of location by 0.241 percent rather than 0.615 
percent before. These results suggest that the choice between a domestic location and any 
foreign location is less tax sensitive than the choice among the set of foreign locations. In 
line with this, Devereux and Griffith (1998) have found that the decision of U.S. 
multinationals to locate abroad – in either France, Germany or the United Kingdom – is not 
tax sensitive, while the choice to locate in any of these three countries does depend on 
taxation.  
A country’s attractiveness as a location for new subsidiaries is potentially affected by 
unobserved country characteristics. In fact, some of the unobserved drivers of location may 
be country-pair specific. To account for this, we next include country-pair fixed effects in the 
estimation. However, the unobserved determinants of, say, German FDI in Poland may be 
different from the determinants of Polish FDI in Germany. To allow for such asymmetry in 
bilateral fixed effects, we in fact include two fixed effects for each country-pair, one for the 
case where a particular country is the parent country rather than the subsidiary country, and 
vice versa. The inclusion of bilateral fixed effects forces us to drop time-invariant bilateral 
variables from the estimation (the dropped variables are Contiguity, Origin of Law, and EU 
membership subsidiary). The estimation results of a linear probability model of foreign 
subsidiary location including the effective tax rate and bilateral fixed effects are presented in 
column 2 in Table 6. Estimation is by OLS rather than by the conditional logit technique to 
obtain convergent results. The effective tax rate obtains a significant coefficient of -0.098, 
which suggests that a one percentage point increase of the effective tax rate reduces the 
probability of foreign subsidiary location by 0.098 percent. Thus, the inclusion of bilateral 
fixed effects and the switch to estimation by OLS jointly reduce the estimated tax sensitivity 
of the foreign subsidiary location choice considerably.    18
A linear probability model that includes separate host country, withholding and parent 
country taxes is reported in column 3, yielding a significant coefficient of -0.109 for the host 
country tax while the withholding and parent country taxes obtain statistically insignificant 
coefficients.  The insignificance of these latter variables in a model including bilateral fixed 
effects is not surprising given that most of the variation in tax rates in our sample is cross-
sectional rather than time-variant.
9  
Next, we recognize that a multinational may establish a subsidiary in more than one 
foreign country in a given year. Specifically, for a multinational that establishes subsidiaries 
in n foreign countries in a given year, we organize the data so that there are n observations of 
1 indicating a new foreign subsidiary and 32 minus n observations of 0 indicating no new 
foreign subsidiary. In this way, we recognize that the 32 potential foreign location choices are 
independent so that location in one foreign country does not preclude location in another 
foreign country. We re-estimate regressions 1 and 5 of Table 5 after structuring the data in 
this fashion and report the results as regressions 4 and 5 of Table 6. The results are 
qualitatively very similar to those reported before.  
Our sample of subsidiary location includes new subsidiaries only in the years they are 
established. This way, we cannot control for unobserved factors that may cause a particular 
foreign subsidiary to have a preference for subsidiary location in a particular foreign country. 
Some multinationals, however, no doubt are drawn to particular foreign countries on account 
of, say, specific public investments in infrastructure. To allow for such unobserved firm-
specific factors, we next estimate a model of foreign subsidiary location using the 
Chamberlain technique. This technique uses the entire time series of a foreign subsidiary’s 
existence rather than data for only the year in which a new subsidiary is established. This 
way, a change in a foreign subsidiary’s status (i.e., its creation or its discontinuation) can be 
                                                 
9 We also estimated boostrapped standard errors to allow for potential within-group correlation across parent   19
related to a change in the international tax system and any other explanatory variable, thereby 
effectively controlling for time-invariant, multinational-specific determinants of foreign 
subsidiary location (see Hamerle and Ronning, 1995).  
Using the Chamberlain technique, we re-estimate regressions 1 and 5 of Table 5, with 
the results reported as regressions 6 and 7 in Table 6. The effective tax rate now enters 
regression 6 in Table 6 with an estimated coefficient of -3.618 that is statistically significant. 
An increase in the effective tax by one percentage point is now estimated to reduce the 
probability of location by 0.633 percent, which is very similar to the analogous estimate of 
0.615 percent before. The separate host country withholding and parent country corporate 
taxes in turn obtain estimated coefficients of -3.254, -3.402 and -5.415, respectively, that are 
all statistically significant. The corresponding semi-elasticities are estimated to be -0.704, -
0.736, and -1.171, respectively, and are all statistically significant. 
 
4.3.  The dimensions of the subsidiary location problem and estimated tax sensitivities 
 
Our estimation considers foreign subsidiary location among a rather large set of 32 
foreign countries. Other studies, as discussed in the introduction, typically consider fewer 
potential foreign locations. Devereux and Griffith (1998), for instance, consider location 
choices of U.S. multinationals among three European countries. The number of countries that 
a multinational can choose from (in a given set of countries) can be seen as one of the 
‘dimensions’ of the location choice problem. Another main dimension of the location 
problem is the number of foreign subsidiaries that a multinational wishes to establish given 
the number of countries that it can choose from. Our large cross-country data set allows us to 
investigate whether and how these dimensions affect the estimated tax sensitivities of 
location choices.  
                                                                                                                                                        
countries in regression 1 of Table 5 and obtained qualitatively similar results.   20
To start, we consider the role of the number of countries that a multinational can 
choose from. A smaller number of potential locations increases the average probability of 
location in any one country. At the same time, we can expect the sensitivity of the probability 
of location to taxation in a country to be higher if there are fewer location options. To 
investigate this, we shrink the number-of-countries dimension of our data set as much as 
possible. To be precise, we go from multinationals that can choose one of 32 foreign 
locations to multinationals that can choose one of two foreign locations. To implement this, 
we specifically consider the establishment of new foreign subsidiaries by multinationals 
located in one of three countries (either France, Germany or the United Kingdom) in one of 
two countries (two of the same three countries).
10 Otherwise the estimation approach is 
analogous to regression 1 of Table 5.  
As reported in column 1 of Table 6, this shrinking of the number-of-countries 
dimension of the data set reduces the sample size to 735 observations. The estimated 
coefficient for the effective tax rate is more negative than before at -11.633 and statistically 
significant. This suggests that location is rather tax sensitive if there are few location options. 
However, the estimated semi-elasticity of location with respect to the effective tax is 
insignificantly estimated as -0.008.  
Next, we consider how the estimated tax sensitivity of location varies with the number 
of foreign subsidiaries a firm wishes to operate. For this purpose, we return to a scenario 
where multinationals can operate foreign subsidiaries in any of the 32 foreign European 
countries. At one extreme, a multinational wishes to operate exactly one subsidiary abroad. In 
that instance, the probability of location in any one country is small, and the sensitivity of the 
location probability to taxation is expected to be small as well. At the other extreme, a 
multinational may want to operate subsidiaries in all foreign countries. The probability of 
                                                 
10 Note that these are the same three countries considered by Devereux and Griffith (1998). We, however,   21
location in a foreign country in this case is one, and the location is completely insensitive to 
taxation. For intermediate values of foreign subsidiaries, the probability of location is less 
than one yet not insignificant and this probability is expected to be affected by taxation. This 
reasoning suggests that the tax sensitivity of location choices depends on the number of 
desired foreign subsidiaries and, more specifically, that this sensitivity may be hump-shaped 
in the number of foreign subsidiaries.  
We first examine how the tax sensitivity of location depends on the number of new 
foreign subsidiaries that a multinational establishes over the 1999-2003 sample period. We 
specifically estimate logit models analogous to regression 1 of Table 5 separately for the 
cases where the multinational exactly establishes one, two, or three new foreign subsidiaries. 
In columns 1-3, we see that the estimated coefficients for the effective tax variable are -3.517, 
-6.924 and -4.692, respectively. The corresponding marginal effects of the effective tax on 
the probability of location are estimated to be -0.430, -1.504 and -0.952, although only the 
second of these sensitivities is estimated to be statistically significant. These results suggest 
that the tax sensitivity of the location probability peaks for multinationals that aim to 
establish exactly two new foreign subsidiaries over the 1999-2003 sample period. The rather 
small number of multinationals that establish exactly four or any higher number of new 
foreign subsidiaries precludes us from estimating with precision analogous regressions for 
higher numbers of new foreign subsidiaries. As an alternative, however, we estimate a single 
regression using the entire sample where we interact the effective tax rate with dummy 
variables signaling that the multinational wishes to establish exactly one, two, three, four, 
five, or more than five new foreign subsidiaries. The estimated coefficients in column 4 of 
the table suggest that the marginal effects of taxation on the location probability peaks for 
multinationals that establish exactly four new foreign subsidiaries. A low estimated tax 
                                                                                                                                                        
consider a binary choice (between two of these three countries), while Devereux and Griffith consider how U.S.   22
sensitivity of location for the case of three new foreign subsidiaries prevents the pattern of 
estimated coefficients to be fully hump-shaped. Overall, our results suggest that the tax 
sensitivity of location indeed varies with the ‘flow’ of new foreign subsidiaries during the 
sample period. 
As an alternative, we next consider whether the tax sensitivity of the location choice 
depends on a multinational’s ‘stock’ of foreign investment in existence at a certain point in 
time. Specifically, we will consider how the tax sensitivity of location depends on the number 
of countries where a multinational operates at least one foreign subsidiary using data only for 
1999, established prior to or in 1999. We refocus the analysis on the number of countries 
rather than the number of foreign subsidiaries, as our tax data in fact distinguish national 
locations.
11 Columns 1 to 5 of Table 8 report the results of regressions where we consider 
subsamples of multinationals operating in exactly one, two, three, four, or five countries. The 
estimated coefficients for the effective tax variables are statistically significant in all five 
regressions, apart from the one where the multinational operates in four countries. The 
estimated coefficients that are statistically significant display a hump-shaped pattern, with the 
estimated coefficient peaking for the case where the multinational operates in exactly two 
countries. Alternatively, regression 6 in the Table includes interaction terms of the effective 
tax variable with dummy variables signaling that the multinational operates in exactly one, 
two, three, four, five, or more than five countries. Four of the six effective tax variables 
obtain statistically significant coefficients. These four variables again display a hump-shaped 
pattern, with the estimated tax sensitivity of location peaking for multinationals that operate 
foreign subsidiaries in exactly four countries. Overall, our results support the hypothesis that 
estimated tax sensitivities of location can be plotted against a multinational’s number of 
countries of operation in the form of an inverted U curve.  
                                                                                                                                                        
multinationals choose one of the three if they wish to have a subsidiary abroad.   23
 
5.  Empirical results on taxation and parent firm location 
 
There are several ways in which a multinational firm can bring about a tax efficient 
international structure. One important way, as considered in previous sections, is the location 
choice of foreign subsidiaries. Alternatively, a multinational may choose to relocate its parent 
firm to another country. One way to do this is through so-called corporate inversions whereby 
the previous parent firm becomes a foreign subsidiary and a previous foreign subsidiary 
becomes the parent. Desai and Hines (2002) find that inversions of U.S. multinationals are in 
part motivated by desire to avoid U.S. corporate income tax on foreign source income. 
Similarly, Voget (2008) finds evidence that international headquarter relocations are 
motivated by a desire to reduce international double taxation. Specifically, he finds that the 
likelihood of headquarters relocation increases in the difference between the home corporate 
income tax and the average of foreign subsidiaries’ corporate income tax rates if a 
multinational resides in a country that provides foreign tax credits as double tax relief of host 
country taxation. In line with this, Huizinga and Voget (2008) find that the parent-subsidiary 
choice in cross-border mergers and acquisitions reflects international tax considerations. 
Whether it is by choosing the subsidiary or the parent, the result should be that the 
observed distribution of parent-subsidiary relationships on average is tax efficient. In this 
section, we investigate whether this is the case for European multinationals with 1999 data. 
Specifically, for each multinational we consider the role of international taxation in the 
parent-subsidiary choice between the actual parent and any of its foreign subsidiaries. 
Analogously to the effective tax rate introduced before, we now define the relative 
effective tax liability as the total tax if the parent firm were in a location A minus the total tax 
if the parent firm were in a location B, divided by the multinational’s worldwide profits. If 
                                                                                                                                                        
11 Firms that operate more than a single subsidiary in a certain foreign country may do so for a variety of reasons   24
positive, the multinational would be better off locating the parent firm in country B rather 
than A, and we expect the probability of parent firm location in country A to be negatively 
related to the effective tax liability. Similarly, we define the relative withholding tax liability 
and the relative parent country tax liability, and we expect these relative tax liability variables 
to negatively affect parent firm location. Further, the relative corporate tax rate is defined as 
the tax rate in location A minus the tax rate in location B, divided by the sum of the tax rates 
in the two locations. We include this variable in the regressions, even though we do not 
expect the relative corporate tax rate to affect the parent-subsidiary constellation 
independently of the relative tax liability variables. As a control variable, we next construct 
the relative size of assets defined as the size of assets in location A minus the size of assets in 
location B, divided by the sum of assets in the two locations. In similar fashion, we define 
relative sales, GDP, per capita GDP and stock market development variables. 
The results of logit regressions of the parent-subsidiary nexus are reported in Table 9. 
Regression 1 includes the relative effective tax liability as the only tax variable. This tax 
variable obtains a negative and significant coefficient to suggest that multinationals on 
average choose their structures so as to minimize their overall tax liabilities. The semi-
elasticity of the probability of parent firm location is estimated to be rather sizeable at -3.074. 
The relative corporate tax rate obtains a negative coefficient but it is not statistically 
significant. Among the controls, the relative sales variable obtains a negative and statistically 
significant coefficient to suggest that parent firms tend to generate relatively few sales. As 
reported in the table, the model has a reasonable goodness of fit as it correctly predicts parent 
firm location in 73.4 percent of the cases. 
Regression 2 includes separate relative withholding tax and parent country tax 
liability variables. Both variables obtain negative coefficients that are not significant. 
                                                                                                                                                        
but the international tax system is not likely to be a main one.   25
Regressions 3 and 4 instead include only the relative parent country tax liability and 
relatively withholding tax liability, respectively. The parent tax liability variable obtains a 
negative and significant coefficient in regression 3, while the withholding tax liability 
variable has a negative and insignificant coefficient in regression 4.  
Finally, regression 5 includes the relative corporate tax variable to the exclusion of all 
relative tax liability variables. As before, the relative corporate tax variable obtains a negative 
but insignificant coefficient.  
Overall, our results indicate that the structure of multinational firms reflects a desire 
to minimize the firm’s overall worldwide tax liability. More precisely, there is evidence that 
multinational firms are designed so as to avoid parent-country corporate income taxation, 
while there is no evidence that non-resident withholding taxes affect the parent-subsidiary 
nexus. 
 
6.  Conclusions 
This paper provides evidence on the implications of international taxation for the 
location and organizational form of multinational firms. Our analysis uses panel data on the 
structure of multinational firms in 33 European countries over the 1999-2003 period. This 
rich data set allows us to advance the literature on taxation and multinationals in three distinct 
ways.  
First, our multi-country data set enables us to estimate the separate effects of host 
country corporate income taxation, host country non-resident dividend withholding taxation, 
and parent-country corporate income taxation location decisions of multinational firms. 
Second, our dynamic data allow us to investigate several distinct facets of the 
relationship between taxation of multinational firm structure. Specifically, we address the 
traditional question of foreign subsidiary location for a given multinational firm, and in   26
addition investigate the international distribution of multinational headquarters across 
countries at a particular moment in time.  
Third, data for a large set of countries enables us to investigate how certain 
‘dimensions’ of the multinational firm choice problem, and in particular how many foreign 
subsidiaries it aims to establish in how many countries, affect estimated tax sensitivities of 
location choices. 
Our main result is that parent-country (double) corporate taxation has an independent, 
strongly negative effect on the probability of foreign subsidiary location in potential host 
countries, despite the fact that parent country taxation can generally be deferred until income 
is repatriated. This may reflect that a parent country’s taxation is rather discriminatory as it 
only applies to parent firms residing in the parent country. The high sensitivity of foreign 
subsidiary location to the parent country tax suggests that this tax is particularly distortive. 
Paradoxically, the parent country tax may  be particularly distortive on account of the foreign 
credit mechanism – aiming to alleviate international double taxation – as the foreign-tax 
credit mechanism produces a high variability of the (post credit) parent-country tax across 
foreign location choices.  
Location decisions regarding the parent firm are similarly shown to be affected by 
parent-country taxation. Specifically, we find that the parent firm is less likely to be located 
in countries with relatively high foreign-source income.  
Our investigation of the ‘dimensions’ of the foreign subsidiary location problem 
shows that estimated tax sensitivities of location decisions vary with the number of countries 
considered as well as with the number of a multinational’s foreign subsidiaries. Specifically, 
we find some evidence that estimated tax coefficients are larger for a smaller number of 
potential foreign location countries in the analysis. Further, we find support for the 
hypothesis that tax sensitivities are largest for multinationals that invest in an intermediate   27
number of foreign countries (between the minimum of 1 and the maximum equal to the 
number of foreign countries in the analysis). These results together suggest that estimates of 
the impact of taxation on international location decisions are best based on data for many 
countries and ideally should take into account an apparent heterogeneity regarding the desired 
scale of investment among multinational firms. 
Overall, our results show that parent-country taxation is instrumental in shaping the 
structure of multinational enterprise. These results have potentially important implications for 
tax policies at the national and international level. While the focus of this paper has been on 
the impact of parent-country taxation on multinational-firm structure, it should be recognized 
that such taxation in addition may distort capital investment and financing decisions once a 
firm’s international structure has been established.   
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Table 1.  Corporate taxation and double-tax relief methods for dividend received in European countries in 2003 
  Corporate tax rate  Treatment of foreign dividends from treaty countries  Treatment of foreign dividends from non-treaty countries 
Austrias 24 Exemption  Exemption 
Belgium  33.99  Exemption (up to 95%)  Exemption (up to 95%) 
Bulgaria 23.5  Indirect  credit  Direct  credit 
Croatia 20  Exemption  Exemption 
Cyprus 15  Exemption  Exemption 
Czech Republic  31  Indirect credit  Deduction 
Denmark 30  Exemption  Exemption 
Estonia  26  Indirect credit  Indirect credit 
Finland 29 Exemption  Direct  credit 
France  35.43  Exemption (up to 95%)  Exemption (up to 95%) 
Germany  39.59  Exemption (up to 95%)  Exemption (up to 95%) 
Greece  35  Indirect credit  Indirect credit 
Hungary 19.64  Exemption  Exemption 
Iceland 18  Exemption  Exemption 
Ireland 12.5  Indirect  credit Indirect  credit 
Italy  38.25  Exemption (up to 60%)  Exemption (up to 60%) 
Latvia 19  Exemption  Exemption 
Lithuania 15  Exemption  Exemption 
Luxembourg 30.38  Exemption  Exemption 
Malta 35  Indirect  credit Indirect  credit 
Netherlands 34.5  Exemption  Exemption 
Norway 28  Indirect  credit Indirect  credit 
Poland 27  Indirect  credit  Direct  Credit 
Portugal  33  Direct credit  Direct credit 
Romania  25  Indirect credit  Indirect credit 
Russia  24  Direct credit  No relief 
Slovak Republic  25  Indirect credit  No relief 
Slovenia 25  Exemption  Exemption 
Spain 35  Exemption  Indirect  credit 
Sweden 28 Exemption  Exemption 
Switzerland 21.74  Exemption  Exemption 
Turkey 33  Indirect  credit  Direct  credit 
United Kingdom  30  Indirect credit Indirect  credit 
Note: Statutory corporate tax rate in Estonia is 0% on retained earnings but a distribution tax of 26% is applied on distributed profit. Corporate tax rate of France includes a 3% social surcharge and a special 3.3% 
surcharge for large companies. Corporate tax rate of Germany includes a solidarity surcharge of 5.5%, an average deductible trade tax of 16.14%, and an exceptional surcharge of 1.5%. Corporate tax rate of Hungary 
includes a deductible local business tax. Corporate tax rate of Ireland applies to trading activities. For non-trading activities, the rate is 25%. Corporate tax rate of Luxembourg includes employment surcharges and 
local taxes. Corporate tax rate of Switzerland applies to the canton of Zurich and includes cantonal and local taxes in Zurich. Treatment refers to double tax relief convention used by parent country. Foreign 
subsidiaries are assumed to be fully owned. The indirect credit system applies to foreign dividends from treaty countries in Poland as long as the holding stake is at least 75% for the past two years and there exists a 
bilateral treaty or the EU parent-subsidiary directive applies. In Portugal, foreign dividends from treaty countries are exempt from corporate taxes if the EU parent-subsidiary directive applies (but the foreign 
withholding tax is not creditable). In some countries, dividend income is exempt from taxes up to a certain percentage, indicated between brackets. Source : International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation.   31









































































































































































































































































































Austria X 0 0  0  10  10  0 5 0 0 0 0 10 25 0 0 25 25  0 15 0 5 10 0 15 5 10 5 0 0 0 25  0 
Belgium  0 X 10  10  10 5  0 25 0 0 0 0 10 25 0 0 25 25 0 15 0 5 10 0 5 10 5 5 0 0 10 15 0 
Bulgaria  0 10 X 5  5 10 5 15 10 5 15 10 10 15 5 10 15 15 5 0 5 15 10 10 10 15 10 15 5 10 5 10 10 
Croatia 0 10 5  X  10  5  5 15 5 5 0 5 5 15 15 10 5 15  15 5 5 15 5 15 5 5 5 15 5 15 5 10  5 
Cypr u s   000  0  X  0  000000000000  00000000000000  0  
Czech Rep. 10 5 10  5  10  X  15 5 5 10 5 15 5 5 5 15 5 5  5 5 0 5 5 10 10 10 5 5 5 0 5 15  5 
Denmark 0 0 5  5  10  15  X 5 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 5 5  0 0 0 0 0 0 10 10 15 5 0 0 0 15  0 
Estonia  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Finland 0 0 10  5  29  0  0 0 X 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 15  0 
France 0 0 5  5  10  10  0 5 0 X 0 0 5 5 0 0 5 5  0 5 0 0 5 0 10 10 10 5 0 0 5 15  0 
Germany 0 0 15  15  10  5  0 5 0 0 X 0 5 5 0 0 5 5  0 5 0 0 5 0 10 5 5 15 0 0 0 15  0 
Greece  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Hungary  10 10 10  10  5 5 5 20 5 5 5 10 X 20 5 10 20 20  5 5 5 10 10 10 5 10 5 10 5 5 10 10 5 
Iceland 15 15 15  15  15  5  0 5 0 5 5 15 15 X 15 15 5 5  5 15 0 0 5 10 15 15 15 15 5 0 5 15  5 
Ireland  0 0 0  20  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20 0 20 X 0 0 0 0 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20 0 
Italy  0 0 10 10 15 15  0 5 0 0 0 0 10 27 0 0 27 5  0 15 0 15 10 0 10 5 15 10 0 0 15 15  0 
Latvia  10 10 10 5 10 5  5 5 5 5 5 10 10 5 5 10 X 0 10 5 5 5 5 10 10 10 10 5 10 5 5 10 5 
Lithuania 15 15 15  5  15  5  5 0 5 5 5 15 15 5 5 5 0 X  15 15 5 5 5 15 10 15 10 5 5 5 5 10  5 
Luxembourg  0 0 0 20  20 0  0 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20 20 X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20 0 
M a l t a   000  0  0  0  000000000000  0X000000000000  0  
Netherlands  0 0 5 0  25  0 0 5 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 5 5 0 5 X 0 0 0 0 5 0 5 0 0 0 5 0 
Norway  5 15 15  15  0 5 0 5 0 0 0 20 10 0 0 15 5 5 5 15 0 X 5 10 10 10 5 15 10 0 5 20 5 
Poland 10 10 10  5  10  5  5 5 5 5 5 15 10 5 0 10 5 5  5 5 0 5 X 10 5 10 5 5 5 5 5 10  5 
Portugal  0 0 15 30 30 15  0 30 0 0 0 0 15 15 0 0 30 30  0 15 0 15 15 X 15 15 30 30 0 0 15 30  0 
Romania 10 5 10  5  10  10  10 10 5 10 10 10 5 10 3 10 10 10  5 5 5 10 5 10 X 10 10 5 10 10 10 10  10 
Russia 5 15 15  5  0  10  10 15 5 5 5 15 10 15 10 5 15 15  10 15 5 10 10 10 15 X 10 10 5 5 5 10  10 
Slovak Rep.  10 5 10 5 10 5 15 15 5 10 5 15 5 15 0 15 10 10 5 5 0 5 5 15 10 10 X 5 5 0 5 5  5 
Slovenia 5 5 15  15  10  5  5 15 5 5 15 15 10 15 5 10 5 5  5 15 5 15 5 15 15 10 5 X 5 5 5 15  5 
Spain  0 0 5 15  15 5  0 15 0 0 0 0 5 5 0 0 15 15 0 15 0 10 5 0 5 5 5 5 X 0 10 15 0 
S w e d e n   000  0  0  0  000000000000  00000000000X00  0  
Switzerland  5 10 5 35  35 5  0 35 5 5 5 5 10 5 10 15 5 5  0 35 0 5 5 10 10 5 5 15 10 0 X 35 5 
Turkey  16.5 16.5 16.5 11 16.5  16.5 16.5 16.5 16.5 16.5 16.5 16.5 11 16.5 16.5 16.5 16.5 11 16.5 16.5 16.5 16.5 11 16.5 16.5 11 5.5 16.5 16.5 16.5 16.5 X  16.5 
United Kingdom 000  0  0  0  000000000000  00000000000000  X  
Notes: Withholding tax rates apply to dividends paid by fully owned subsidiaries in source country to parent firm. Bilateral tax treaties are taken into account. Subsidiary directive is binding between EU Member States 
and provides exemption from withholding tax if equity holding is at least 25%. The reported figures assume an equity holding in the subsidiary of at least 25%. In Ireland, subsidiaries owned by parent companies 
resident in EU or treaty countries are exempt from withholding tax provided that they are not under the control of persons not resident in such countries. In Italy, authorities can provide a refund equal to the tax claimed 
limited to 4/9 of the Italian withholding tax if the recipient can prove a tax is paid in his country on the dividend. In Luxembourg there is an exemption from withholding tax for EU and treaty partners if holding in 
company resident in Luxembourg is at least 10%. Source: International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation.   32

































































































































































































































































































A u s t r i a   X11  1  1  1  111111101100  1  11111111111111  
Belgium  1X1  1  1  1  101111101100  1  11111111111111  
Bulga r i a   11X  1  1  1  101111101100  1  11111101011101  
C r o a t i a   110  X  1  1  101111100111  0  01110111001001  
Cypr u s   111  1  X  1  100111101100  0  10110111101001  
Czech Rep.   111  1  1  X  111111111111  1  01111111111101  
Denmark  111  1  1  1  X11111111111  1  11110111111111  
E s t o n i a   000  0  0  1  1X1110011111  0  01110000001001  
F i n l a n d   111  1  0  1  11X111111111  1  11111111111111  
F r a n c e   111  1  1  1  111X11111111  1  11111111111111  
Germany  111  1  1  1  1111X1111111  1  11111111111111  
Greece  1 1 1 1 1 1 10111X101100  1  01111101011101  
Hungary  111  1  1  1  101111X01100  1  11111111111111  
I c e l a n d   000  0  0  1  1111100X0011  1  01111000011101  
I r e l a n d   111  0  1  1  11111010X111  1  01111111111101  
Italy  111  1  1  1  111111101X01  1  11111111111111  
L a t v i a   000  1  0  1  1111100110X1  0  01110101101101  
L i t h u a n i a   000  1  0  1  11111001111X  0  01110101101101  
Luxembourg  111  0  0  1  101111111100  X  11111111111101  
M a l t a   111  1  1  1  111110100110  1  X1111101001101  
N e t h e r l a n d s   111  1  0  1  111111111111  1  1X111111111111  
Norway  111  1  1  1  111111111111  1  11X11111111111  
P o l a n d   111  1  1  1  111111111111  1  111X1111111111  
Portuga l   111  0  0  1  101111111100  1  1111X111010101  
R o m a n i a   111  1  1  1  101111101111  1  01111X11111111  
R u s s i a   111  1  1  1  101110101100  1  011111X1011111  
Slovak Rep.   111  1  1  1  101111101111  1  1111111X111111  
S l o v e n i a   110  0  1  1  101110101111  1  01110111X11101  
Spa i n   111  0  0  1  101111111100  1  011111111X1101  
S w e d e n   111  1  1  1  111111111111  1  1111111111X111  
S w i t z e r l a n d   111  0  0  1  101111111111  1  11111111111X01  
Turkey  111  1  0  0  101110100101  0  011101110010X1  
United Kingdom 111  1  1  1  111111111111  1  1111111111111X  
Notes: This paper addresses whether a tax treaty was operative to deal with income received by countries listed in the rows and originating from countries listed in the columns. Specifically, 1 denotes that a bilateral tax 
treaty was applicable and o denotes that a tax treaty was not applicable.  The table is not exactly symmetric as the dates of first application of a treaty may slightly differ between two treaty partners. Source: 
International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation and various ministries’ websites. 
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 Table 4.  Descriptive statistics for subsidiaries of European multinationals 
 
Panel A: Number of parent companies and subsidiaries used in basic regression. 
  Number of parent companies  Number of subsidiaries 
Country  by home country  by home country  by host country 
Austria 9  28  32 
Belgium 36  171  172 
Bulgaria 11  31  14 
Croatia  0 0 1 
Cyprus  0 0 0 
Czech  Republic  0 2 7 
Denmark 28  224  309 
Estonia  6 8 2 
Finland 23  85  106 
France  116 274 152 
Germany 75  266  282 
Greece  48 135 46 
Hungary 0  2  10 
Iceland 3  11  12 
Ireland 11  18  46 
Italy 78  272  177 
Latvia  2 2 3 
Lithuania  0 0 1 
Luxembourg  1 1 4 
Netherlands 89  199  118 
Norway 45  77  202 
Poland 6  7  45 
Portugal 21  51  31 
Romania 0  0  37 
Russia 1  10  0 
Slovak  Republic  1 2 0 
Slovenia 6  16  0 
Spain 56 350  432 
Sweden 76  224  218 
Switzerland 14  40  10 
Turkey  0 0 0 
United  Kingdom  144 588 625 
Total 906  3,094  3,094 
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Panel B: Summary statistics for variables in basic regression 
Variables N  Mean  Standard  dev.  Min  Max 
Subsidiary location  26,567  .034  .182  0  1 
Effective  tax  26,567  .353 .073 .125 .750 
International tax  26,567  .051  .071  0  .550 
Host country tax  26,567  .302  .083  0  .567 
GDP bilateral  26,567  .033  .054  .0003  .245 
Contiguity 26,567  .148  .355  0 1 
Origin of law  26,567  .245  .430  0  1 
Difference in labor costs  26,567  -1.834  1.031  -8.003  .068 
Economic freedom  26,567  6.430  1.021  3.8  8.425 
EU membership 
subsidiary 
26,567 .464  .499  0  1 
 
Panel C: Correlation matrix for variables in basic regression 


















Subsidiary  location  1.0000           
Effective  tax  -.0059  1.0000          
International  tax  -.0801**  .3375**  1.0000         
Host  country  tax  .0630**  .5970**  -.5537**  1.0000        
GDP  bilateral  .1672**  .2656**  -.2908**  .4827**  1.0000       
Contiguity  .0734**  0.0793**  -.1099**  .1639**  .2323**  1.0000      
Origin  of  Law  -.0031  .0388** -.0151* .0471**  -.0213**  .2551** 1.0000       
Difference in  labor 
costs 
-.0815** .0258**  .1954** -.1437** -.1715** -.1842** -.1452**  1.0000     
Economic freedom  .1032**  -.1437**  -.1661**  .0144**  .1942**  .0791**  .0057  -.3124**  1.0000   
EU membership 
subsidiary 
.1404  ** .0618** -.4992** .4801** .4975** .2093** .1111** -.4099** .4890**  1.0000 
Note: Effective marginal tax rate (τ) is the statutory tax rate on dividend income generated in the subsidiary country, taking withholding taxes and the tax system for foreign 
source income into account. Local taxation in subsidiary country is the corporate tax rate, including local taxes and possible surcharges applicable in the subsidiary country. 
International taxation is defined as the difference between the effective marginal tax rate and the local taxation in the subsidiary country. GDP bilateral is the ratio of the GDP 
in the foreign host country to the sum of GDP of all other foreign alternatives. Contiguity is a binary variable taking the value 1 if the parent and the subsidiary countries have 
a common border. Origin of law is a binary variable taking the value 1 if the parent and the subsidiary countries have a common origin of law as defined in La Porta et al. 
(1998). Difference in labor costs is the log of the absolute value of the difference in labor costs. Economic freedom is an index scaled between 0 and 10 and is an average of 
the following Fraser indicators for the subsidiary country: a sound legal system, absence of trade barriers, and absence of price controls. EU membership is a binary variable 
taking the value 1 if the subsidiary country is member of the European Union. Basic regression refers to  regression 1 in Table 5. * denotes significance at 5%; ** 
significance at 1%.   35
Table 5.  Taxation and foreign subsidiary location 
 
The dependent variable is subsidiary location equaling 1 if a new subsidiary is located in a country and 0 otherwise. Effective tax is the tax rate on dividend income generated 
in the potential subsidiary country resulting from corporate income taxation in host and parent countries and non-resident withholding taxation in the host country.  Host 
country corporate tax is the corporate income tax in the subsidiary country, including local taxes and possible surcharges. International taxation is the difference between the 
effective tax and the host country corporate tax. GDP bilateral is the ratio of the GDP in a potential host country to the sum of GDP of all potential host countries. Contiguity 
is a binary variable equal to 1 if the parent and potential host countries have a common border. Origin of law is a binary variable equal to 1 if the parent and potential host 
countries have a common origin of law as defined in La Porta et al. (1998). Difference in labor costs is the log of the absolute value of the difference in labor costs between 
parent and potential host countries. Economic freedom is an index scaled between 0 and 10 reflecting the following Fraser indicators of the potential host country: soundness 
of legal system, absence of trade barriers, and absence of price controls. EU membership is a binary equal to 1 if the potential host country is a member of the European 
Union. Sample reflects location decisions of new foreign subsidiaries. Estimation is by conditional fixed effects logit model. White (1980)'s heteroskedasticity-consistent 
standard errors are reported between brackets after clustering by corporate groups. Marginal effect is the slope of the probability curve with respect to an independent variable 
evaluated at mean values for all independent variables. Semi-elasticity is the associated semi-elasticity of the probability of subsidiary location with respect to an independent 
variable. * denotes significance at 10%; ** significance at 5%. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables (predicted sign of 
coefficient) 
Basic regression  Host country corporate 
tax 
International tax  Host country corporate 
and international taxes 
Withholding and parent 
country corporate taxes 
Effective tax ( - )  -3.964** 
(.555) 
    











Withholding tax ( - )          -1.005 
(1.322) 
Parent country corporate tax ( - )          -5.626** 
(1.252) 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables (predicted sign of 
coefficient) 
Basic regression  Host country corporate 
tax 
International tax  Host country corporate 
and international taxes 
Withholding and parent 
country corporate taxes 
Number of observations  26,567  26,567 26,567 26,567 26,567 
Pseudo  R-squared  .14  .14 .13 .14 .14 
        
Effective  tax  mean    .353      
Effective  tax    marginal  effect  -.615**      
Effective  tax    semi-elasticity  -.761**      
       
Host country corporate tax  mean    .302    .302  .302 
Host country corporate tax  
marginal effect 
 -.274**  -.607**  -.626** 
Host country corporate tax  semi-
elasticity 
 -.306**    -.751**  -.761** 
       
International tax  mean      .051  .051   
International tax  marginal effect      -.074*  -.638**   
International tax semi-elasticity      -.076*  -.789**   
       
Withholding  tax  mean      .029 
Withholding tax  marginal effect          -.147 
Withholding tax  semi-elasticity          -.179 
       
Parent  country  corporate  tax  mean       .022 
Parent country corporate tax 
marginal effect 
     -.823** 
Parent country corporate tax semi-
elasticity 
     -1.002**   37
Table 6.  Taxation and foreign subsidiary location: robustness tests 
 
The dependent variable is subsidiary location equaling 1 if a new subsidiary is located in a country and 0 otherwise. Effective tax is the tax rate on dividend income generated 
in the potential subsidiary country resulting from corporate income taxation in host and parent countries and non-resident withholding taxation in the host country.  Host 
country corporate tax is the corporate income tax in the subsidiary country, including local taxes and possible surcharges. Withholding tax is the withholding tax rate in a 
potential host country. Parent country corporate tax is the difference between effective tax and the sum of host country corporate tax and withholding tax. Contiguity is a 
binary variable equal to 1 if the parent and potential host countries have a common border. Origin of law is a binary variable equal to 1 if the parent and potential host 
countries have a common origin of law as defined in La Porta et al. (1998). Difference in labor costs is the log of the absolute value of the difference in labor costs between 
parent and potential host countries. Economic freedom is an index scaled between 0 and 10 reflecting the following Fraser indicators of the potential host country: soundness 
of legal system, absence of trade barriers, and absence of price controls. EU membership is a binary equal to 1 if the potential host country is a member of the European 
Union. Sample reflects location decisions of new foreign subsidiaries. Estimations of 1, 4 and 5 are by the logit model, of 2 and 3 is by the linear probability model, and of 6 
and 7 by is by the model proposed of Chamberlain. White (1980)'s heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported between brackets after clustering by corporate 
groups. Marginal effect is the slope of the probability curve with respect to an independent variable evaluated at mean values for all independent variables. Semi-elasticity is 
the associated semi-elasticity of the probability of subsidiary location with respect to an independent variable. * denotes significance at 10%; ** significance at 5%. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 



























































Contiguity  ( +  )  1.062** 
(.060) 








Origin of Law ( +/- )  .419** 
(.055) 




































EU membership subsidiary  ( + )  1.669** 
(.100) 








Constant    .040  .045        38
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 



















Number  of  observations  51,061 26,945 26,945 25,024 25,024  163,222  161,575 
Pseudo  R-squared  .30 .18 .18 .14 .14 .11 .11 
         
Sample mean Effective tax  .353      .353    .342   
Marginal effect Effective tax  -.201**      -.620**    -.633**   
Semi-elasticity Effective tax  -.241**      -.767**    -.818**   
         
Sample mean host country tax          .302    .291 
Marginal effect host country tax          -.633**    -.552** 
Semi-elasticity host country tax          -.770**    -.704** 
         
Sample  mean  withholding  tax         .029  .009 
Marginal effect withholding tax          -.145    -.577** 
Semi-elasticity withholding tax          -.177    -.736** 
         
Sample  mean  parent  country  tax         .023  .041 
Marginal effect parent country tax          -.827**    -.918** 
Semi-elasticity parent country tax          -1.006**    -1.171** 
         
Prediction  (prob  location)  .835      .808 .822 .774 .784   39
 Table 7.  Tax sensitivity of foreign subsidiary location and the number of new subsidiaries 
 
The dependent variable is subsidiary location equaling 1 if a new subsidiary is located in a country and 0 otherwise. Effective tax is the tax rate on dividend income generated 
in the potential subsidiary country resulting from corporate income taxation in host and parent countries and non-resident withholding taxation in the host country.  Host 
country corporate tax is the corporate income tax in the subsidiary country, including local taxes and possible surcharges. Withholding tax is the withholding tax rate in a 
potential host country. Parent country corporate tax is the difference between effective tax and the sum of host country corporate tax and withholding tax. Contiguity is a 
binary variable equal to 1 if the parent and potential host countries have a common border. Origin of law is a binary variable equal to 1 if the parent and potential host 
countries have a common origin of law as defined in La Porta et al. (1998). Difference in labor costs is the log of the absolute value of the difference in labor costs between 
parent and potential host countries. Economic freedom is an index scaled between 0 and 10 reflecting the following Fraser indicators of the potential host country: soundness 
of legal system, absence of trade barriers, and absence of price controls. EU membership is a binary equal to 1 if the potential host country is a member of the European 
Union. Sample reflects location decisions of new foreign subsidiaries. Estimation is by the conditional fixed effects logit model. Regression 1 restricts the sample to 
observations where multinational firms resident in France, Germany or the United Kingdom establish a new foreign subsidiary in one other two countries. Regression 2, 3, 
and 4 restrict the sample to observations where multinational firms establish 1, 2 or 3 new foreign subsidiaries during the sample period. Regression 5 includes interaction 
variables of the effective tax rate with dummy variables signaling that the multinational establishes 1, 2 ,3 4, 5, or more than 5 new foreign subsidiaries. White (1980)'s 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported between brackets after clustering by corporate groups. Marginal effect is the slope of the probability curve with 
respect to an independent variable evaluated at mean values for all independent variables. Semi-elasticity is the associated semi-elasticity of the probability of subsidiary 
location with respect to an independent variable. The goodness of fit is the percentage of correct predictions (either fitted value of location >0.5 and actual location=1 or fitted 
value of location=<0 and actual location =0).  * denotes significance at 10%; ** significance at 5%. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 








Interactions with the 
number of existing 
foreign subsidiaries 









Effective tax interacted 1 sub ( - )          -4.433** 
(.867) 
Effective tax interacted 2 subs ( - )          -3.726** 
(1.080) 
Effective tax interacted 3 subs ( - )          -3.172** 
(1.301) 
Effective tax interacted 4 subs ( - )          -5.028** 
(1.479) 
Effective tax interacted 5 subs ( - )          -4.177** 
(1.960) 
Effective tax interacted more than 
5 subs ( - ) 
      -3.591** 
(.834) 



















(.082)   40
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 








Interactions with the 
number of existing 
foreign subsidiaries 






































Number of observations  735  21,612  3,382  1,391  26,567 
Pseudo  R-squared  .18 .13  .17 .17 .14 
Goodness-of-fit  .728 .966  .966 .966 .966 
          
Sample mean Effective tax  .383  .355  .344  .355   
Marginal effect Effective tax  -.020  -.430**  -1.504**  -.952   
Semi-elasticity Effective tax  -.020  -.502*  -4.715*  -1.328   
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Table 8.  Tax sensitivity of foreign subsidiary location and the number of foreign countries 
 
The dependent variable is subsidiary location equaling 1 if a new is located in a country and 0 otherwise with data only for 1999. Effective tax is the tax rate on dividend 
income generated in the potential subsidiary country resulting from corporate income taxation in host and parent countries and non-resident withholding taxation in the host 
country.  Host country corporate tax is the corporate income tax in the subsidiary country, including local taxes and possible surcharges. Withholding tax is the withholding 
tax rate in a potential host country. Parent country corporate tax is the difference between effective tax and the sum of host country corporate tax and withholding tax. 
Contiguity is a binary variable equal to 1 if the parent and potential host countries have a common border. Origin of law is a binary variable equal to 1 if the parent and 
potential host countries have a common origin of law as defined in La Porta et al. (1998). Difference in labor costs is the log of the absolute value of the difference in labor 
costs between parent and potential host countries. Economic freedom is an index scaled between 0 and 10 reflecting the following Fraser indicators of the potential host 
country: soundness of legal system, absence of trade barriers, and absence of price controls. EU membership is a binary equal to 1 if the potential host country is a member of 
the European Union. Sample reflects location decisions of new foreign subsidiaries. Estimation is by the conditional fixed effects logit model. Regressions 1, 2,3, 4 and 5 
restrict the sample to observations where multinational firms have foreign subsidiaries in 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 countries. Regression 6 includes interaction variables of the 
effective tax rate with dummy variables signaling that the multinational has foreign subsidiaries in 1, 2 , 3, 4, 5, or more than 5 countries. White (1980)'s heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors are reported between brackets after clustering by corporate groups. Marginal effect is the slope of the probability curve with respect to an 
independent variable evaluated at mean values for all independent variables. Semi-elasticity is the associated semi-elasticity of the probability of subsidiary location with 
respect to an independent variable. The goodness of fit is the percentage of correct predictions (either fitted value of location >0.5 and actual location=1 or fitted value of 
location=<0 and actual location =0).   * denotes significance at 10%; ** significance at 5%. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variable (predicted sign of 
coefficient) 




Exactly four foreign 
locations 
 
Exactly five foreign 
locations 
Interactions with the 
number of countries 
in which the parent 
has existing 
subsidiaries 











Effective tax interacted 1 host 
country ( - ) 
       -4.842** 
(.901) 
Effective tax interacted 2 host 
countries ( - ) 
       -7.209** 
(1.188) 
Effective tax interacted 3 host 
countries ( - ) 
       -7.408** 
(1.602) 
Effective tax interacted 4 host 
countries ( - ) 
      - 2 . 8 1 9 *  
(1.578) 
Effective tax interacted 5 host 
countries ( - ) 
      -5.875** 
(1.146) 
Effective tax interacted more than 
5 host countries ( - ) 
       -4.979** 
(1.159) 












Contiguity  ( +  )  .448**  .688** .273  .091  .169 .359**   42
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variable (predicted sign of 
coefficient) 




Exactly four foreign 
locations 
 
Exactly five foreign 
locations 
Interactions with the 
number of countries 
in which the parent 
has existing 
subsidiaries 
(.146) (.188) (.277) (.365) (.268) (.084) 
















































Number  of  observations  6,947  4,698 3,405 1,836 2,025  23,285 
Pseudo  R-squared  .13  .14 .10 .12 .11 .11 
Goodness-of-fit  .963  .963 .965 .965 .964 .964 
         
Sample mean Effective tax  .378  .369  .370  .356  .352   
Marginal effect Effective tax  -.398  -.510  -1.309  -.865**  -.758   
Semi-elasticity Effective tax  -.459  -8.658** -1.890  -3.311 -7.193**   
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Table 9.  Taxation and parent firm location 
 
The dependent variable is choice of location of the parent for each pair of companies. It is equal to 1 if the corporate choice (the pair parent-subsidiary) is the actual choice and 0 otherwise. Each 
regression uses a logit model without a constant. All regressions use the tax on sales of companies as a proxy for profit and include country dummies that take the value 1 if the parent is located 
in this country, -1 if the subsidiary is located in this country and 0 otherwise. In regression 1, the difference in effective tax liability is the difference between the effective tax burden paid by the 
group on its total profit between the 2 choices of location for the parent. This difference can be split into differences due to withholding taxation and differences due to the parent country 
treatment of the repatriated profit. Those are reflected in regressions 2 to 4. The relative corporate tax is the statutory tax rate of the parent company minus the statutory tax rate of the subsidiary 
divided by the sum of these two tax rates. The relative size of assets is total assets of the parent company minus the total assets of the subsidiary divided by their sum. The relative size of sales is 
the sales of the parent company minus the sales of the subsidiary divided by their sum. The relative GDP is the GDP of the parent's country minus the GDP of the subsidiary country divided by 
their sum. The relative GDP per capita is the GDP per capita of the parent's country minus the GDP per capita of the subsidiary country divided by their sum. The relative financial development 
is sum of the domestic credit and market capitalization in percentage of GDP of the parent's country minus the sum of the domestic credit and market capitalization in percentage of GDP of the 
subsidiary's country divided by their sum. We report White (1980)'s heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors between brackets after clustering by corporate groups. The semi-elasticity 
indicates the change in the probability to locate abroad (in percent) following an increase in the tax variable by 1 percentage point, given the independent variables and holding all other 
variables constant (in this case at their mean value). They are computed as the probability of a positive outcome. Marginal effect is the slope of the probability curve relating the independent 
variable to the probability of the dependent variable to take the value 1, given the independent variables and holding all other variables constant (in this case at their mean value). It shows the 
change in the probability to locate abroad (in percentage point) following an increase of the tax variable by 1 percentage point. The goodness of fit is the percentage of correct predictions (with 

















Tax variables       
Relative effective tax liability  -11.556** 
(5.745) 
    




















Control variables       


































































Number  of  observations  756 756 756 756 756 
Number of corporate groups  653  653  653  653  653 
Log-Likelihood  -382.035 -381.687 -381.712 -383.177 -383.939 
Goodness-of-fit  .743 .743 .743 .743 .743 
       
Sample mean of relative effective tax liability  .001         
Marginal effect relative effective tax  liability  -2.256**         
Semi-elasticity relative effective tax liability  -3.074**         
       
Sample mean of relative withholding tax liability    .000    .000   
Marginal effect relative withholding tax liability    -.525    -2.569   
Semi-elasticity relative withholding tax liability    -.715    -3.510   
       
Sample mean of relative parent country tax liability    .000  .000     
Marginal effect of relative parent country tax liability    -3.863  -4.132**     
Semi-elasticity of relative parent county tax liability    -5.259  -5.625**     
       
Sample mean of relative corporate tax  -.006  -.006  -.006  -.006  -.006 
Marginal effect relative corporate tax  -17.466  -17.574  -17.711  -18.332  -19.366* 
Semi-elasticity relative corporate tax  -23.795  -23.924  -24.110  -25.050  -26.520*   45
Appendix. Variable definitions and data sources 
 
Variable Definition  Source 
Location of subsidiary  Dummy  variable equal to one if foreign subsidiary is located in a country 
and zero otherwise 
Amadeus database (Bureau Van Dijk) 
Location of parent  Dummy  variable equal to one if parent firm is located in a country and 
zero otherwise 
Amadeus database (Bureau Van Dijk) 
Effective  tax  Combined, bilateral tax on the subsidiary’s income if repatriated in the 
form of dividends as a share of the subsidiary’s pre-tax income 
International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation 
and various ministries 
International tax  Sum of withholding tax and parent country corporate income tax as a share 
of the subsidiary’s pre-tax income 
International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation 
and various ministries 
Withholding tax  Withholding tax calculated as a share of the subsidiary’s  pre-tax  income  International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation 
and various ministries 
Parent country corporate tax  Residual parent tax calculated as the difference between the effective tax 
and the sum of the host country corporate income tax and the withholding 
tax, as a share of the subsidiary’s pre-tax income 
International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation 
and various ministries 
GDP bilateral  Ratio of the GDP of the host country to the sum of GDP of all possible 
foreign locations. 
Ameco database (European Commission) 
Contiguity  Binary variable taking the value 1 if the parent and the subsidiary countries 
have a common border 
Authors’ calculation 
Origin of law  Binary variable taking the value 1 if the parent and the subsidiary countries 
have a common origin of law 
La Porta et al. (1998) 
Difference labor costs  Log of the difference in labor costs (Labor compensation per unit of output 
in USD 1990). 
OECD 
Economic  Freedom  Time-varying index scaled between 0 and 10 and is an average of the 
following Fraser indicators for the subsidiary country: a sound legal system 
(A trusted legal framework exists for private businesses to challenge the 
legality of government actions or regulation), transfer and subsidies in % of 
GDP, absence of regulatory trade barriers, and absence of price controls 
(extent to which businesses are free to set their own prices) 
Fraser Institute – Economic Freedom of the 
World Index 
EU membership subsidiary  EU membership  subsidiary s a binary variable taking the value 1 if the 
subsidiary country is member of the European Union 
Authors’ calculation 
Relative  effective  tax  liability  Difference of total tax liability of multinational firm on assumption of 
parent firm location in any two countries divided by total multinational firm 
assets 
Amadeus database (Bureau Van Dijk)and 
International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation 
and various ministries 
Relative withholding  tax 
liability 
Difference of withholding tax liability of multinational firm on assumption 
of parent firm location in any two countries divided by total multinational 
firm assets 
Amadeus database (Bureau Van Dijk)and 
International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation 
and various ministries   46
Variable Definition  Source 
Relative parent country tax 
liability 
Difference of parent country tax liability of multinational firm on 
assumption of parent firm location in any two countries divided by total 
multinational firm assets 
Amadeus database (Bureau Van Dijk)and 
International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation 
and various ministries 
Relative corporate tax rate  Corporate tax rate in a country divided by sum of corporate tax rates in all 
countries of establishment of multinational firm 
Amadeus and International Bureau of Fiscal 
Documentation and various ministries 
Relative  assets  Assets in a country divided by sum of assets in all countries of 
establishment of multinational firm 
Amadeus database (Bureau Van Dijk) 
Relative sales  Sales in a country divided by sum of sales in all countries of establishment 
of multinational firm 
Amadeus database (Bureau Van Dijk) 
Relative GDP  GDP in a country divided by sum of GDPs in all countries of establishment 
of multinational firm 
Amadeus database (Bureau Van Dijk) and 
Ameco database (European Commission) 
Relative GDP per capita  GDP per capita in a country divided by sum of GDPs per capita in all 
countries of establishment of multinational firm 
Amadeus database (Bureau Van Dijk) and 
Ameco database (European Commission) 
Relative stock market 
development 
Stock market development, computed as stock market capitalization 
relative to GDP, in a country divided by sum of stock market developments 
in all countries of establishment of multinational firm 
Amadeus database (Bureau Van Dijk) and 
Ameco database (European Commission) 
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